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RESUM/RESUMEN/ABSTRACT:  
The Petersberg Tasks is the most ambitious set of operational tasks the EU has set itself in the 
development of the CSDP. For the practical utility of this set of tasks, it can be expected that the 
strategic cultures of the member states have to be compatible to a large extent in order to create 
a European strategic culture with a clear conception. This study compares the strategic cultures 
of Germany, the United Kingdom and France in respect of their compatibility by testing a 
comprehensive paradigm of strategic culture in two recent cases, offering the circumstances of 
conducting the Petersberg Tasks. 
 
RESUM EN CATALÀ:  
Les missions Petersberg són l'operatiu militar més ambiciós organitzat per la Unió Europea en 
el desenvolupament de la CSDP, Política Europea de Seguretat i Defensa. Amb l'objectiu 
d'aconseguir una organització efectiva y funcional d'aquestes missions, és desitjable que les 
cultures estratègiques dels diferents Estats membres siguin, en gran mesura, compatibles en 
benefici d'una cultura estratègica europea amb directrius clares. Aquest estudi compara les 
cultures estratègiques d'Alemanya, el Regne Unit i França en referència al seu nivell de 
compatibilitat contrastant-les amb dos casos recents, exemples paradigmàtics de cultures 
estratègiques integrals. D'aquesta manera, pretenem descriure les circumstàncies en què es 
desenvolupen les missions Petersberg. 
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I) Introduction  
 
After the cold war, the global security environment had significantly changed. The great 
threat for Europe - another devastating and possibly nuclear war on European soil 
between the US (or NATO) and the Soviet Union - was finally banned after the fall of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. Consequently, with the absence of this existential threat, the 
transatlantic security community embraced their responsibility for conflict prevention 
and solution or peace-keeping and peace-making in a global context. In a United 
Nations context, this sort of tasks is known as the initiative “Responsibility to Protect”. 
In Europe, the Petersberg Tasks form the catalogue for operational task in this global 
security context.  
The Petersberg Tasks, elaborated in 1992 by the West European Union (EU) in Bonn, 
Germany, and extended in the following Treaties of the European Union, include in 
Article 28B of the Treaty of Lisbon:  “...joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping 
tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-
conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, 
including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories."  
The European perspective on international security and international crisis management, 
which should be shaped by those tasks, can be observed on distinct but often 
interdependent policy making levels. A very obvious starting point is a multilateral 
perspective to analyze the functioning of the institutional framework of the European 
Union as an actor in this foreign policy realm. Interestingly enough after this framework 
had been reformed with the Treaty of Lisbon, CFSP and CSDP have been object to 
numerous studies examining democratic legitimation, organizational effectiveness and 
real impact of EU Foreign Policy. For further reading of studies from EU perspective, a 
number of scholars can be recommend, for example Helene Sjursen
1
, dealing with 
democratization of CFSP, as well as Nicole Koenig
2
 and Daniel C. Thomas
3
 about the 
                                                          
1
 see: Sjursen, Helene (2011): The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: the quest for democracy, 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 8, pp. 1069-1077 
2
 see: Koenig, Nicole (2011): The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?, The International 
Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 11-30  
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EU’s quest for a coherent foreign policy. Highly recommendable are also the thoughts 
of Anand Menon
4
 and Sten Rynning
5
 evaluating research approaches for the study of 
CFSP CSDP. 
This study however choses a point of view that has not received the deserved attention 
but is constituted at the very fundament of a functioning common security policy of an 
emerging multilateral strategic actor as the EU. It seeks to identify and comparatively 
analyze nation-specific strategy styles with the objective of making statements about the 
likeliness of a functioning CSDP crisis management based on cultural compatibility as 
it is translated into strategic behavior. Because, although other explanatory factors like 
institutional and capability limitations play a greater or lesser role, ignoring the nation-
specific strategic culture means risking ‘blackboxing’ governments and opening up for 
all the intellectual dangers of misperception.
6
  
Embracing this perspective, it can be presumed that combining the security policy 
standpoints of 28 Member States is an objective of utter ambitiousness. They can be 
expected to have a very different idea of threat evaluation, the conditions for the use of 
force and the global outlook. For such a set of operational tasks as the Petersberg Tasks, 
that includes the necessity to respond fast and fierce to grave violations of human rights 
or terrorists threatening the orderliness of sovereign states, the countries of the 
European Union should – if not share a common strategic culture – at least be 
compatible to a degree that allows quick decision finding and action. Thus, comparing 
the strategic cultures of the EU member states seems to be a logical, continuative first 
step when examining the EU’s ability to conduct the full range of the Petersberg tasks 
on a CSDP level. 
The study aims to identify strategic cultures in Europe and to test the inferred national 
strategic behavior in two recent international crises that offered quite precisely the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3
 see: Thomas, Daniel C. (2012): Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in 
European Union Foreign Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2012, pp. 457–474 
4
 see: Menon, Anand (2012): Power, Institutions and the CSDP: The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2012, pp. 83-100   
5
 see: Rynning, Sten (2012): Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2012, pp. 23-42 
6
 Booth, Ken (2005): Strategic Culture: Validity and Validation, Oxford Journal on Good Governance, 
Vol. 2, Nr. 1, March 2005, p.27 
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conditions, the implementation of the Petersberg tasks was intended for. By revealing 
the connection between strategic culture and strategic behavior in these scenarios, 
statements about the compatibility for the context of international crisis management 
can be made.   
Truly significant and therefore object of interest for this study are the big three of the 
EU, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. Although the dynamics between the 28 
single states of the European Union and the dynamics between certain groups with 
common security interests are decisive factors for the EU’s ability to respond to 
international crises, the CSDP crises management depends heavily on the relation and 
interaction between the United Kingdom, France and Germany.  
To investigate the influence of strategic culture in international crisis management 
situations, the study takes a look at two violent civil-war crises, namely in Libya 2011 
and Mali 2012/2013. The choice for these two case studies is guided by the proximity in 
time that doesn’t leave much room for interpretations based on a slow evolvement that 
strategic culture could entail. What does make these two cases different from each other 
and worth investigating is that they share quite precisely the composition of a civil-war 
like conflict as covered by the Petersberg Tasks but differ widely in their geopolitical 
relevance, thus in the quality of attention they receive in the international community. 
While in Libya US and NATO commitment was strong, the European countries were 
almost left alone in concern about the conflict between jihadists and the government in 
Mali with either the option to act unilaterally or within a CSDP conducted mission. Due 
to the variety of differences that exponentially rises when adding observation levels, the 
non-commitment of the NATO will form the central differing element regarding the 
analytical considerations.  
The referent group in the case studies is the individually defined elite of the ‘political-
military decision-making sphere’, which has more detailed insights in security issues, 
reflect societal moods and are by profession shaping the agenda and national discourse.
7
 
Narrowing the referent group to the mentioned elite gives us the opportunity to entail 
information from a rich scope of elements without drifting into irrelevance. A limited 
referent group very suitable for the outreach and scope of this study, are directly 
                                                          
7
 Longhurst, Kerry (2004): Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 
1989–2003, Manchester University Press., p.22 
10 
 
involved political-military decision takers. Thus, the study limits the referent group to 
Head of State, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and official representatives of those 
positions.  
The objects of analysis will be limited to a representative sample of content of official 
and public statements addressing the opinion-making, decision-making and decision-
justification of the political-military sphere in the key moments of the chosen crises. 
Given the interdependence between public discourse and decision-making sphere, it can 
be assumed, that if a strategic culture exists it has to materialize in the decision-
communication towards the public and the representatives in the parliament.    
For the purpose of tracing strategic behavior deriving from strategic culture in the 
objects of analysis, a symbol analysis is most suitable for the abovementioned objects. 
If strategic culture indeed has dominant effects on strategic behavior, it can be assumed 
that the behavioral pattern experienced a social translation into a specific rhetoric and 
language that is constant across decision-making sphere (even if opinions differ) and 
strategic context and be logically related to the set of preferences.  
If the strategic behavior proves to be congruent across the cases it can be argued that a 
strategic culture exists and transfers to a certain degree into strategic behavior that is 
predictable. This degree will be defined by how dominant cultural aspects have 
influenced the strategic behavior when argued against the influence of ahistorical or 
non-cultural, hence materialistic-structural factors.  
The first section is dedicated to the research framework, providing a brief history of the 
notion of strategic culture in security studies and a comprehensive analytical framework 
for strategic culture. The second section will then translate central historical and cultural 
tenets into this framework for each of the three countries. In the third section this 
framework is tested in the selected case studies. The results regarding the strategic 
behavior in the case studies will then, as the conclusion, allow making statements, 
addressing the driving question behind this study: Does a nationally individual strategic 
culture translate into strategic behavior, and if so, are the strategic cultures of Germany, 
the United Kingdom and France compatible to a degree that enables the construction of 
an effective CSDP crisis management? 
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II) Research Framework 
 
A. The notion of Strategic Culture in Security Studies  
 
This section elaborates the development of the notion of strategic culture as an 
instrument to analyze nation-state behavior in security and defense related decision 
taking, with an implicit focus on the use of military force. The concept of strategic 
culture is hereby an interdisciplinary, constructivist theory that aims to make statements 
and predictions about nation-state behavior that cannot be sufficiently explained by 
strictly realist approaches. According to Ken Booth, one of the most renowned 
researches in the field of strategic culture, several of its attributes makes it an essential 
complementary theory in the science of international relations.
8
 First, it contributes to 
the understanding of the behavior of a strategic actor on its own term, for example 
taking history into account. Also, it tears down the boundary between the domestic 
environment in which decisions are produced and the external security environment by 
reminding that decision-making and military structures and processes operate in specific 
political cultures. Finally, it helps to explain irrationalities in the behavior of a culture 
other than the observer’s and therefore improve communication and general 
understanding. In the following, this section wants to explain how the concept of 
strategic culture significantly contributes to the understanding of nation-state’s military 
behavior and to give insights about the dynamics of security policy in a multilateral 
framework. 
Strategic culture was first introduced into the field of security studies when Jack Snyder 
examined possible reactions to limited nuclear operations as a discussed alternative to 
previously prepared massive operations. In this study, Snyder defined strategic culture 
as ‘the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual 
behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through 
instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy’9 and 
concludes that unique historical experiences, distinctive political and institutional 
                                                          
8
 Booth, Ken (2005): Strategic Culture: Validity and Validation, Oxford Journal on Good Governance, 
Vol. 2, Nr. 1, March 2005, p.26-27 
9
 Snyder, Jack L. (1977): The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, 
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-2154-AF, 1977, p.8 
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relationships and the preoccupation with a different set of strategic dilemmas had indeed 
produced a ‘unique mix of strategic beliefs and a unique strategic behavior based on 
these beliefs’10. This interpretation challenged the classical view of generic rational 
actor paradigms and game-theory models that saw the United States and the Soviet 
Union as two actors playing the same nuclear war game and suggested that they would 
therefore apply similar strategic decision making.
11
 Snyder assumed a certain 
consistency in this strategic culture that would, if not unlink strategic behavior from the 
immediate conditions and changes in the strategic environment, but make it respond ‘in 
a way mediated by preexisting cultural beliefs’.12  
Along with Snyder there was a number of scholars in the late 70’s and early 80’s that 
came to the conclusion that contemporary security and defense studies did not 
recognized sufficiently that much of  the strategic ideas and strategic behavior depend 
on the ‘educational progress of social construction’.13 Because of the ongoing cold war 
and the United States as the birthplace of this first generation of scholars, it is not 
surprising that much of their work was intended to provide insights about the strategic 
behavioral patterns of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the use of 
nuclear force. Colin S. Gray, one of the most renowned scholars of the first generation 
addressed in his early works the notion of national style compared to the rational style 
of the United States strategy and the dynamics between national style and nuclear 
strategy.
14
 Other important contributors were Carnes Lord, writing implicitly about the 
American Strategic Culture
15
 as well the Carl G. Jacobson, Ken Booth and David R. 
Jones when comparing the strategic power of the United States and the Soviet Union
16
. 
                                                          
10
 Ibid., p.38 
11
 Longhurst, Kerry (2004): Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 
1989–2003, Manchester University Press., p.8 
12
 Snyder, Jack L. (1977), The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, 
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-2154-AF, 1977, p.8 
13
 Gray, Colin S. (1999): Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back, Review 
of International Studies, 25, p.51 
14
 See: Gray, Colin S. (1981) ‘National Style in Strategy: The American Example,’ International Security, 
Vol.6, 1981, pp. 21–47 
15
 See: Lord, Carnes (1985): American Strategic Culture, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, 1985, pp. 269–93 
16
 Jacobson, Carl G.; Booth, Ken; Jones, David R. (1990): Strategic power: USA/USSR, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, May 1990 
13 
 
Their findings suggested that the Soviet Union had a preference for preemptive, 
offensive use of force that was deeply rooted in Russia’s history of external 
expansionism and internal autocracy. The United States, on the other hand, showed the 
tendency for a sporadic, messianic and crusading use of force that was deeply rooted in 
the moralism of the early republic and in a fundamental belief that warfare was an 
aberration in human relations.
17
 
With the introduction of this interdisciplinary approach into the field of security studies, 
Snyder and the other agents of the „first generation” engaged decent scholarly attention 
for the notion of Strategic Culture. This attention led to the continuous development of 
the concept of strategic culture in the following years that was marked by the spill-over 
from nuclear strategy studies into all fields of security studies and severe methodical 
controversies. The common classification of strategic culture into three generations of 
scholars differently addressing those concerns was introduced by Alastair Ian Johnston 
in his works about strategic culture.
18
 For Johnston, considering him of the third 
generation, the separation of the generations is not only applied on the scopes of interest 
but puts emphasis on the severe logical consequences the different methodical 
approaches and the interpretation of the results have. Because of space constraints and 
the utter importance of exactly this controversy for the present study, the 
methodological debate between Alastair Ian Johnston as agent of the third generation 
and Colin S. Gray as agent of the first generation will be the methodological aspect in 
spotlight.   
The first generation, as mentioned above, wanted to explain the fundamental and 
hegemonic differences between US’ and Soviet thoughts on nuclear strategy. Scholars 
from this generation innovatively added Strategic Culture to the realm of security 
studies but also demonstrate severe weaknesses in their studies. Those weaknesses 
described by Johnston are related to the vague and all-consuming definition, the 
mechanically deterministic conclusions and the unchangeable persistency.
19
  
                                                          
17
 Johnston, Alistair I. (1995): Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security, Vol. 19, No 4, 
1995, p. 36 
18
 Ibid., p.36 
19
 Ibid., p.38 
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Third generation scholars in most part thoroughly exclude strategic culture from 
strategic behavior but assume that the country-specific strategic culture does have an 
effect on a nation’s strategic behavior.20 The determinism of the first generation is 
neglected by excluding behavior from the independent variable and conceptualizing 
strategic culture in a way that allows it to vary, affected by recent experiences much 
more than by deeply historically rooted determents.
21
 Johnston concludes that the 
general strength of the third generation and its superiority rely on the researchability of 
the approach by turning strategic culture into the independent variable and strategic 
behavior into the depended variable, where organizational culture can be an intervening 
variable
22
 
The description of particular weaknesses of the different approaches helps to identify 
and address key concerns when creating a research framework dealing with strategic 
culture. In its essences however, Johnston thoughts on strategic culture are a heavy 
critique on the first generations failure to explain anything because they tried to explain 
everything
23
  
In Gray’s opinion, scholars of the third generation in general, and Johnston as its most 
progressive agent, do not understand the nature and concept of strategic culture, when 
implying that strategic behavior can be observed distinctively from strategic culture in a 
cause/effect relation from the former on the latter. The methodological rigor that 
Johnston applies ‘is admirable but it ought not to take precedence over an inconvenient 
reality’.24 
In promoting the idea that makers of strategic decisions would be quasi non-cultural 
entities that are affected by strategic culture as well as other explanatory factors (e.g. 
                                                          
20
 Ibid., p.41 
21
 Legro, Jeffry W. (1995) , Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); cited in Johnston (1995): Thinking about Strategic 
Culture, p.41 
22
 Johnston, Alistair I. (1995): Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security, Vol. 19, No 4, 
1995, p. 42 
23
 Gray, Colin S. (1999): Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back, Review 
of International Studies, 25, p.54 
24
 Gray, Colin S. (2006): Out of the Wilderness: Primetime for Strategic Culture, United States Nuclear 
Strategy Forum, Publication No.0004, 2006, p.3 
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from a materialistic-structural perspective), they would illogically assume that a 
decision taking person could be left uncultured by his social background. Gray notes 
that ‘Strategic behavior can be eccentric from some viewpoints, incompetent, 
unsuccessful, even contrary to cultural norms, but it cannot be a-cultural, beyond 
culture. A de-cultured person, organization or security community would have to be 
deprogrammed even of the process of learning about, and from, his or its own past’.25  
It is hard to escape the logic of Gray’s arguments, in finding that strategic behavior 
patterns are a part of a nation’s strategic culture. Observing the realm of strategic ideas 
separately from the realm of strategic behavior in order to weigh the influence of 
strategic culture against other explanatory factors does indeed imply the existence of a 
realm not exhibited by encultured human beings. Thus applying the notion of strategic 
culture means to embrace the idea of an all-encompassing context as there indeed 
cannot be strategic behavior beyond culture. 
But if the concept of Strategic culture ‘defies falsification’26, trying to explain all that 
‘weaves together’27, how can a research framework be conducted that still provides 
information to interpret strategic behavior patterns regarding the use of force, occurring 
in a security sub-context like crisis management, leading to plausible insights about the 
general compatibility of the countries which can be seen as a necessity for the 
independent functioning of multilateral framework like the CSDP? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Gray, Colin S. (1999): Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back, Review 
of International Studies, 25, p. 62 
26
 Longhurst, Kerry (2004): Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 
1989–2003, Manchester University Press., p.19 
27
 Gray, Colin S. (1999): Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back, Review 
of International Studies, 25, p. 68 
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B. A Framework for Strategic Culture 
 
This study follows the concluding recommendation of Colin S. Gray, not to pursue 
strictly one line of research (first vs. third generation) but to find new, practical ways to 
combine the two main approaches.  
It makes the assumption that a contemporary country-specific strategic culture, which is 
dominated by persistent, normative elements based in historical experience and shaped 
by recent experiences, influences and shapes the nation-state behavior regarding the use 
of force.  
But instead of testing this strategic culture against other explanatory factors when 
making statements and predictions about the persistency of strategic behavior over time, 
this study tries to observe the functioning of strategic culture in two different strategic 
contexts. It wants to query, if and how the contemporary strategic culture has translated 
into strategic behavior patterns when applied in specific strategic scenarios and if they 
show consistency across strategic contexts. If they prove to be consistent across 
strategic contexts, it would mean that the strategic cultures of the three countries indeed 
influence strategic behavior. This would then make it possible to predict further 
strategic behavior in other contexts and therefore to make statements about the 
compatibility of the strategic cultures. If they show great variance across the contexts, it 
would imply that strategic culture has less influence then the strategic context which 
would lead to the result that the strategic behavior of the three countries is context-
dependent and thus not sufficiently predictable by the ideational culture of the countries.    
With this objective in mind, this section first produces an analytical framework that 
leads us to a testable image of the contemporary country-specific strategic culture of the 
United Kingdom, France and Germany. Keeping in mind what Gray stated about the 
universality of Culture this image has to be to some degree descriptive and arbitrarily 
weighted from the researcher’s perspective. Nevertheless, the close relation of the 
observed dimensions of strategic culture to the study interest should reduce the 
methodological flaw that inevitably occurs at some point of any strategic cultural study. 
To address this flaw in favor of the testability, the study will rely on the strategic culture 
paradigm as proposed by Johnston. 
17 
 
As a definition of the composition of a strategic culture serve three basic elements of 
Strategic Culture described by Kelly Longhurst.
28
  
Foundational elements of a strategic culture are those basic, deeply rooted values and 
qualities that have their origin in a primordial or formative phase of the country. 
Security policy standpoints lie between foundational elements and the regulatory 
practices and can be best described as common contemporary interpretations of how 
core values of a strategic culture are to be promoted through a framework of preferences 
of policy choices by political decision-takers. Regulatory practices form the observable 
manifestation of strategic culture. They are ‘longstanding policies and practices that 
actively relate and apply the substance of the strategic culture’s core to the external 
environment, essentially by providing channels of meaning and application’29. The 
regulatory practices are dependent on the dynamic between foundational elements and 
security policy standpoints. Thus, regulatory practices usually are a set of policy-options 
given to decision makers in a general regulatory context, restraint by foundational 
elements of the strategic culture.   
The study will translate secondary literature that has been produced about the three 
countries in question, and primary sources when necessary, into a model of ranked 
strategic preferences that inspired by Johnston’s central paradigm of strategic culture.30 
With a ranked set of preferences it will later be possible to make statements about the 
effect of strategic culture via the consistency of the ranking assumed across the varying 
strategic contexts. Also it is a way to reduce the estimated effect of cross-national 
overlapping ideational elements as ranking will lead to a further specification and 
individualization of the element as of the whole set.   
In his studies, Johnston made assumptions about ‘the role of war in human affairs 
(whether it is inevitable or an aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the 
threat it poses (zero-sum or variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force 
(about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the conditions under 
                                                          
28
 Longhurst, Kerry (2004): Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 
1989–2003, Manchester University Press., p.17 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Johnston, Alistair I. (1995): Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security, Vol. 19, No 4, 
1995, p. 46 
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which applied force is useful).
31
 With the disappearance of a third, possible nuclear war 
and the constant disappearance of clear antagonism in global politics, the assumption 
that European countries would face in any way a zero-sum threat can’t be made. Still, 
the perception of the threat can translate into offensive, unilateral win-maximizing or 
compromised, multilateral win-distributing strategies. Thus, although it meets fairly 
well the scope of interest the study will translate it into a more contemporary set of 
preferences and objectives. For this purpose, the study will use a table, inspired by 
Wilhelm Mirow.
32
  
proclivity to use of 
force
1 2 3 4
Conditions for the use 
of force
Territorial defence, 
reaction to immediate 
threat
Plus humanitarian 
Intervention, stopping 
grave violation of human 
rights
Plus self-serving 
intervention, pursuit of 
power, material or 
ideological interests
Plus territorial & 
political expansion and 
conquest
Military Strategy
Restraint, highly 
proportionate, low risk 
tolerance
proporitionate, low-
moderate risk tolerance
Disproportionate, 
moderate risk tolerance
Highly disproportionate, 
high risk tolerance
Level of cooperation Neutrality (defensive)
Affiliation with 
alliances/Organisations
Affiliation with 
particular states
unilateralism (offensive)
International/domestic 
authorisation 
requirements
high domestic/high 
international
high domestic/low 
international
low domestic/high 
international
low domestic/low 
international
  
 
The ranking will occur through arbitrarily, weighting the foundational elements, 
security policy standpoints and to some extent the regulatory practice within each of the 
dimensions in order to make a statement about their magnitude. At this point, there is a 
direct link between strategic culture and strategic behavior. 
                                                          
31
 Ibid. 
32
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III) The Strategic culture of Germany, the United Kingdom and France 
 
A. The Strategic Culture of Germany 
 
1. Essential Elements of the German Strategic culture 
 
Discovering a formative period in which foundational elements have their origin proves 
to be in the German case an endeavor not too difficult. After World War II, Germany’s 
pre-war strategic culture that was shaped by its extraordinary militarism and the deep 
nationalistic sentiments due to its defeat in World War I, was turned into the exact 
opposite. Germany’s strategic preferences are very much influenced by this formative 
period.  
For Germanys devastating defeat, a burning Europe and the feeling of guilt for the 
uniquely horrifying crimes committed by the Nazi Regime, the Germans blamed its ill 
culture of militarism and nationalism and were eager to erase it.
33
 At the same time, the 
international community was determined to eliminate all militaristic capacities and 
tendencies in order to prevent Germany being a substantial global threat again.
34
 The 
German society fully cooperated with the Allied occupants by bringing the old military 
and political elite to justice and distributing anti-military propaganda for example 
through relentless text books for schools.
35
 Being traumatized and ashamed of the 
crimes they had committed or were a conscious part of, the guilt that Germans felt, 
made them unable to feel pride towards their nation.
36
 Germans suffered from an 
exhaustion of nationalism and statism, which means that the concept of the state as the 
organizing principle to which pledge allegiance, was highly rejected within a mindset, 
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in which the state is the problem and not the solution.
37
 Alienated by the prospect of yet 
creating an own national identity, several tendencies in Germany after WWII summed 
up to form a preferences for multilateralism and the integration into a broader 
international framework. Because Germany should never again be able to conduct 
unilateral power politics, the recommendation for the integration in international 
security commitments fixed in the German Basic Law, provided for an alternative 
foreign policy strategy.
38
   
The military in Germany was not only perceived with a different notion, but rejected in 
its entirety after WWII. It was no longer seen as the embodiment of a national identity 
and self-consciousness but the image of the soldier was defamed, removing military 
culture entirely from state and society.
39
 This relation to the military and the use of force 
was also established in the German Basic Law, that forbids the preparation of a war of 
aggression and restraints the use of the German military to defense purposes in own 
territory or the territory of allied countries.
40
 The military was denied of being 
instrument of foreign policy and embedded in the multilateral NATO-framework, with 
the Bundeswehr subordinated to NATO allied command.
41
  
After the cold war when international crisis management entered the main stage of 
international security policy and along with its non-military contribution in the Gulf 
War 1990/1991, Germany’s foreign policy was criticized of being weak, pacifistic and 
neutral, accused of using cheap excuses for its restraint and the international community 
demanded the normalization of Germany’s security policy.42 Germany’ decision makers 
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were struggling with having the inherent desire to be a reliable partner and the 
international pressure on the one hand, while having the deeply rooted anti-militarism in 
its public discourse. Consequently, it was not until 1994 when Germany’s constitutional 
court confirmed the basic compatibility of the German Basic Law with the use of force 
in foreign territory, leaving the interpretation of a key security policy issue to the 
domestic legal framework.
43
  
The high expectations that have been generated by that development have been 
disappointed since then. The often criticized strategic deficit that Germany displays in 
international crisis situations is mainly due to varying degree of public debate on 
specific situations. When the media coverage is strong and critical, German 
governments tend to follow more pacifistic point of views, in topics that don’t receive 
full attention by media and public debate, deployment of military forces just might be 
an option. This drastic discrepancy in the perceptions of Germany as a global security 
actor between Germany’s political leaders and the German people forms today maybe 
the most defining element of the strategic culture of the country as a whole. As a precise 
example for this discrepancy serves the resignation of Germany’s former 
Bundespräsident (president of the federation) Horst Köhler who tripped over the remark 
that it is absolutely justifiable to conduct German military capacities to secure 
Germany’s vital economic interests. The outrage and critique in the German media and 
public debate were intense enough to frustrate the Bundespräsident who was 
overwhelmed by the public reaction and resigned in consequence.
44
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2. Strategic preferences for Germany  
 
Conditions for the use of force  – 2 
The deployment of military forces –especially the deployment of combat troops- in 
foreign territory has not stopped to be a topic of utmost delicacy in Germany. The 
juridical restraints and fierce public and parliamentarian debate that go along every 
decision regarding the use force, define war as the absolute aberration and the last of all 
means in human affairs. As a sub-assumption of a preferred strategic option, it can be 
inferred that German policy-makers will only deploy military troops when substantially 
threatened or as a last resort in case that all other non-military strategies in an 
international crisis have failed and catastrophic consequences can be expected.  
Military Strategy – 1 
The deeply rooted anti-nationalism forbids Germany to pursue power or interest politics 
to a large scale. Offensive strategies are constraint to a very limited set of justifiable 
options, with extremely low risk tolerance. Thus, restraint strategies have the prospect 
of securing beneficial outcomes while leaving a significantly broader flexibility in 
political action. It can be inferred that German policy-makers will choose non-
confrontational strategies and highly restraint military operations. 
Level of cooperation - 2 
Germany is embedded into a network of multilateral organizations and political 
frameworks. For a long time directly subordinated to the NATO-command, a driving 
force for the European Integration and the functioning of the United Nation, it can be 
inferred that German decision makers will only apply military force in a broad 
framework of multilateral organizations and its allies.  
International/domestic authorization requirements - 1 
Germany is heavily constraint by its Basic Law when the military is sought to be used 
as foreign policy instrument. Also a German use of force, without a UNSC mandate and 
European support seems unimaginable. Thus, it can be inferred that Germany has high 
international and domestic authorization requirements. 
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B. The Strategic Culture of the United Kingdom 
 
1. Essential Elements of the UK’s strategic culture 
  
The participation in two world wars and the aftermath of those devastating wars have 
consequently left their mark on post-war Great Britain, shaping existent foundational 
elements and imposing new ones. Still, the implications naturally differ widely from 
those of Germany both from a social and a political perspective and specifically in their 
magnitude. Hence, the strategic culture of the United Kingdom was rather shaped than 
newly invented by WW II. The same does apply for the second formative period of 
Tony Blair being Prime Minister from 1997-2007, that should prove to be a very 
influential anomaly indeed.   
Starting as a major colonial and maritime power into the 19th century, the United 
Kingdom saw a severe decline in relative power over the course of two world wars and 
an exhaustingly threatening cold war.
45
 By the end of WW II, the United Kingdom had 
to face the fact that it had been displaced as the leader or hegemon of the international 
community. Nevertheless, the notion of the empire and the desire to maintain the status 
quo remained vital in British strategic culture as a heritage of the country’s glorious 
past.
46
  
Guided by the multilateral structures that emerged after World War II (most notably the 
NATO) the United Kingdom’s policy makers as well as the British people were 
reminded of the importance of the transatlantic link in security matters and the cultural 
ties between Great Britain and the United States. The purpose for this was the common 
concern about the soviet menace and the possibility for the former hegemon to conduct 
a foreign policy that would be more influential than its relative power suggested.
47
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As it is the case with Germany, the notion of crisis management became central to 
British security policy after the common threat of a new world war was banned by the 
fall of the Soviet Union. In line with the other NATO Members, the United Kingdom’s 
security policy was in search for a new raison d’être.48 Although the defense and 
deterrence strategy that entailed the cold war era was consequently abandoned, the Gulf 
War 1990/1991 displayed the high demand for ‘sanitized’ military involvement in 
international crisis management and generated high expectations in the conventional use 
of force.
49
  
When coming into office in 1997 Blair was eager to redefine British foreign policy, 
paying special attention to the role of the armed forces and international crisis 
management. Blair pursued the strategy of attempting to create and mediate an all-
encompassing western-led international security framework of EU, NATO and the UN 
Security Council - referred to as the “international community” - with an interventionist 
approach.
50
 This military doctrine was very much taken from George W. Bush’s 
military doctrine of pre-emptive strikes and disregards the sanctity of national 
sovereignty based on the Westphalian states system in cases where nation-states have 
systematically sought to abuse the rights of individuals or groups within their territory.
51
 
This was a fundamental shift in the conditions under which the UK would consider the 
use of force, in that values might have to be fought for with military force. As Clark 
states, Blair saw a world that was about the willingness to embrace a liberal democratic 
capitalist world order on a global scale in which the use of military force for fighting is 
as much a policy instrument in the developing world as foreign aid.
52. Blair’ 
interventionism that was not thoroughly supported by British people is an influential 
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anomaly regarding Britain’s conservative tradition. “The continuous effort of avoiding 
any shift in the international balance of power for over a century can explain why the 
British polity has been tormented with conservatism. British political leaders, electorate, 
even the academia were oriented against risky policies, avoiding initiating invasive 
ventures, and joining only after benefits had been secured.”53 Although it is to expect 
that tory governments like the one of Prime Minister David Cameron are keen to 
preserve aspects of the conservative tradition, the impact of Blair’s years in office on 
the strategic environment for his successors is tremendous. Following more than 
influencing George W. Bush’s war on Iraq, the UK has participated in creating the 
threats of the 21st century. Addressing these threats requires at least an alteration of the 
traditional conservatism.    
The UK’s colonial past, coupled with its institutional embedding in the international 
community, has created a sense of responsibility and global outlook in the minds of the 
British public and political elites regarding the UK’s international responsibilities for 
peacekeeping and crisis management. There are no obvious ‘no go areas’ for the UK 
armed forces in the way that the German armed forces are constrained.
54
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2.  Strategic preferences for the United Kingdom 
 
Conditions for the use of force – 3  
Blair’s interventionism and classical Tory conservatism differ essentially in the question 
of pre-emptive strikes and the justification for conducting combat forces. Cameron’s 
conservatism is more likely to considerate all possible consequences and decide more 
pragmatically. It can be inferred that British decision-makers will apply military force if 
it serves the British scope of interest and potential consequences are perceived as 
justified by potential outcomes.  
Military Strategy - 2 
The element of conservatism, provided in the observed period, promotes strategic 
considerations with a low risk tolerance towards casualties and costs. Still, the United 
Kingdom is willing to raise the risk tolerance to small scale if British interest is at stake. 
It can be inferred that British decision-takers will choose restraint military options to 
avoid casualties and costs.   
Level of cooperation – 3 
The United Kingdom has a differentiated look on the European Integration and seems to 
cooperate just in the case it serves its interest. Of particular importance is the strong 
alliance with the USA. It can be inferred, that British decision-makers work to together 
with particular states, most preferably via the transatlantic link.  
International/domestic authorization requirements – 2 
The notion of conservatism implies that the use of British force and military personnel 
has to be justified adequately in front of the public discourse and the parliament. 
Internationally, the United Kingdom as a member of the Security Council is mostly 
unrestrained, in particular cases is US support necessary. Thus, it can be inferred that 
the United Kingdom has high domestic and low international authorization 
requirements. 
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C. The Strategic Culture of France 
 
1. Essential Elements of France’ Strategic Culture 
 
The French strategic culture was fundamentally shaped in two periods after the Second 
World War. While the basic foundational elements were laid in France’ so-called fourth 
republic in the time right after WW II, the French Strategic Culture as a stable notion 
was implemented in France’ fifth republic, when Charles de Gaulle, arguably the most 
influential Frenchman in France post-war foreign policy, consolidated these elements 
into a national strategy.
55
 Philip H. Gordon states that although the vision of Charles de 
Gaulle was the continuation of the fourth republic’s vision of France’ defence, the 
Gaullist years are still unique, long lasting, clearly definable and highly consequential.
56
  
 ‘Grandeur’ is one of the terms that frequently appear when French Foreign Policy 
standpoints or, more negatively interpreted, French nationalism is described. In the 
opening lines of ‘Memoires de guerre’, Charles de Gaulle states that for him ‘France is 
not really herself unless in the front rank; that only vast enterprises are capable of 
counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people; that our 
country as it is, surrounded by others, as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight, 
on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without 
greatness.’57  
Although introducing the notion of ‘greatness’ into French strategic culture, Charles de 
Gaulle never defined how ‘grandeur’ actually translates in behavior. This task was left 
to historians of his presidential heritage. ‘Grandeur’ can be best summarized as the will 
to be an ambitious, universal and inventive player in global politics and defend the 
independence, the honor and the rank of the nation. Still, Grandeur should imply 
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unlimited imperialistic ambitions as it did the notion of empire which roots back to the 
pre-war era and was excessively present in the fourth republic.
58
  
In summary, the ‘grandeur’ aspect of France’ strategic culture entails in its quintessence 
the idea that France is an regionally and globally leading security actor that is 
independent from multilateral security frameworks in its capability to provide for his 
own interest. France nuclear deterrence policy is one example for this independence, as 
well as national interest politics in its sphere of influence (e.g. ex-colonial Africa) that 
have been perceived as neo-colonialist policies.
59
  
A second aspect of the French strategic culture is it challenging American hegemony, an 
element also constituted in Gaullism. In an in-depth analysis of French anti-
Americanism, Sophie Maunier identifies distinctive forms of French anti-
Americanism.
60
 Although a fundamental aspect of Gaullism, the French anti-American 
sentiments last already for centuries and are deeply rooted within political and cultural 
elite alike. The French political critique circles around the power ambitions of the 
United States with inherent hypocrisy regarding the liberal values and the disregard 
over territorial sovereignty of states.
61
  Also, the cultural influence of the US on Europe 
is met with deep skepticism.
62
 This cross-contextual anti-Americanism manifested in 
French opposition and critique to US foreign policy in numerous occasions throughout 
the post-war era, dominated by Gaullist France challenging US foreign policy. 
Opposing the war on Iraq is commonly seen as the model case for this anti-
Americanism shown in political decisions. Although French anti-Americanism was 
used to legitimize the standpoint and wholeheartedly embraced by the decision making 
sphere, common sense and the lack of direct national interest contributed significantly 
to the opposition.  Other occasion like the heavy critique on the US approach in 
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aftermath of the Tsunami 2004, criticizing that US interest motivated rather than 
humanitarian aspects, the opposition of the Vietnam War, the culture-driven public 
debates about the Google Print project and the most recent concerns regarding the 
transatlantic free trade agreement, serve as self-evident cases of recent anti-
Americanism.
63
  
The third element, whose foundation lies within the 4th republic but was fully embraced 
by de Gaulle’s fifth republic, was the reconciliation with Germany and the attempt to 
embed the neighbor into a French-led European framework. The idea behind the 
reconciliation on the French side - and in de Gaulle’s mind in particular - was to bind 
the threat that Germany was still believed to constitute at that time within a multilateral 
framework and to benefit from Germany’s vast economic potential in a French-led 
European economic and defense integration.
64
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2. Strategic preferences for France 
 
Conditions for the use of force – 3 
The notion of grandeur implies that the French armed forces have to be at any given 
moment capable of ensuring the security of the nation and preserving the French 
interest, independent from any given multilateral security framework. It can be inferred 
that French decision makers will choose to deploy the military force when French vital 
interests or the security of its global standing are at stake. 
Military Strategy - 3 
Likewise the notion of grandeur sets the course for this variable, in that France has an 
exceptional, leading status in the world. This standing is to preserve and defend even if 
costs considerably high. It can be inferred that French decision-makers will choose 
offensive strategies and embrace the risk as long as it defends France’ standing in the 
world.  
Level of cooperation - 3 
Although a driving force behind European Integration, French cooperation is mainly 
guided by an avoidance of the US-led NATO framework due to the traditional anti-
Americanism. It can be inferred that cooperation happens context-dependent along 
French interest and is usually the cooperation with particular states, especially 
Germany.  
International/domestic authorization requirements - 4 
The notion of Grandeur is to a large extent socially integrated. French public discourse 
does therefore only marginally restrain the use of force. From the international 
perspective is France as a permanent Member of the UNSC able to conduct military on 
its own behalf and would have to face rather mild diplomatic consequences if not acting 
in line with the whole UNSC. It can be inferred that France’ authorization requirements 
are low both from a domestic and international point of view. 
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D. Graphical illustration of the Nations’ paradigm 
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IV) Strategic Culture in Practice 
 
A. Case Study Libya 
 
1. Germany’s strategic behavior in Libya 
 
‘Decisions on the use of military force are always extremely difficult to take. We have 
carefully considered the options of using military force, its implications as well as its 
limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be 
underestimated. If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of 
being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region. We 
should not enter a military confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results 
with few casualties will be achieved. Germany, therefore, has decided not to support a 
military option as foreseen particularly in OP 4 and OP 8 of the resolution. Furthermore, 
Germany will not contribute to such a military effort with its own forces.’65  
With this statement, the German ambassador to the United Nations, Peter Wittig, 
declared Germany’s abstention from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 
Entailed in this statement, is the assessment of the conditions by German foreign policy 
elites regarding the possible military strike. The statement is emphasizing especially 
Germany’s very low risk tolerance, given that an intervention would still lie within the 
expected range of conditions where the use of force as a humanitarian intervention is a 
justifiable option.  
For Germany’s internal decision-making process leading to the abstention, Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle has been the acknowledged driving force.
66
 The day after 
the passing of UNSC Resolution 1973, he further emphasized the awareness of dramatic 
risks as driving factor by stating that ‘we are still very skeptical about the option of a 
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military intervention in Libya also included in the resolution. We see considerable 
dangers and risks in this. Therefore we cannot agree to this part of the resolution. 
German soldiers will not participate in a military operation in Libya.’67  
In a session of the German Parliament, he showed himself in particular skeptical about 
the effectiveness of a no-fly zone in ‘in a country like Libya [...] which is approximately 
four times bigger than the Federal Republic of Germany’. Westerwelle raised the 
possibility that the intervention may ‘weaken rather than strengthen the democratic 
movements across North Africa’68 and answered to the question of a German journalist, 
if political pressure is of any matter to a crazy dictator: “The question is, if Germany 
fights a war in Libya, with international participation […] and I won’t accept, that there 
is a war fought in Libya with German soldiers […] Because what if the no fly zone, that 
means airstrikes, proves to be unsuccessful, with ground forces further approaching? 
Are we going to go there then with our own ground forces like it happened in Iraq? I 
want to prevent Germany from such an asymmetrical situation”.69  
The impression of Germany pushing out of circle of the Western security framework - 
considering the rigor with which it justified its abstention - was even enforced when 
Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere indirectly accused the British and French of a 
lack of planning, saying that: ‘’I believe that each military operation must be analyzed 
to determine whether its goals can be achieved with appropriate means and within an 
appropriate time frame as well as how one gets out at the end. Every one.”70 
Over the course of the conflict however, Germany has not been sidelined constantly. 
Germany sought the cooperation with all possible allies and international organizations, 
promoting thoroughly their understanding of international law. Guido Westerwelle was 
keen to ensure that he welcomes UNSC Resolution 1970 as the ‘hoped-for clear 
response from the international community to the brutality of the Libyan leadership’71 
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as well as EU Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP and added that they are both decisions 
‘that we worked actively to help bring about.’72 Only one week before UNSC 
Resolution 1973, Westerwelle announced that ‘the international community must 
increase the pressure on the Libyan leadership. The UN Security Council has to take 
another look at the situation in Libya. Additional targeted sanctions and an end to all 
payments to the Qadhafi regime need to be urgent items on the EU and UN agendas. 
Every action beyond the scope of targeted sanctions must be authorized by the UN 
Security Council and can only proceed with the approval of partners in the region.’73 
Demonstrating the strong cooperationist tradition of German Foreign Policy, Germany 
was pushing the topic forward in the international agenda as long as a political solution 
was possible. When a military strike became probable, Germany backed out of the 
international community. This indicates that the extreme risk aversion of German 
decision-makers is the dominant factor, surely more dominant than other yet observed 
notions of strategic culture like seeking international cooperation and the basic 
willingness to apply in international crisis management.  
Chancellor Angela Merkel had left designing an adequate response to Libya to Guido 
Westerwelle and his Federal Foreign Office and made clear in an interview right after 
the abstention that her Foreign Minister had acted in line with her position on the 
matter. In an interview on March 17th, she said that the abstention does not signify not 
acting and defended the economic sanctions imposed. Regarding a military intervention 
she still offered a somewhat different perspective, saying that she is ‘very skeptical 
about a military intervention and that I, as chancellor, can’t lead German Forces into a 
mission with highly uncertain prospects’.74 When asked at what point she would 
consider military action, she answered: “We defined that point very clearly in 
Afghanistan for example. The terrorism planed and armored there is a threat for Europe. 
It can be said beyond any doubt that in Afghanistan our security is defended. That 
reasoning does not apply for Libya.”75 Next to the low risk tolerance, Chancellor 
Merkel directly refers to an aspect defined in the strategic culture that has to be 
                                                          
72
 Westerwelle, Guido (2011e): Official Statement 07.03.2011, Auswärtiges Amt 
73
 Westerwelle, Guido (2011f): Official Statement 28.2.2011, Auswärtiges Amt 
74
 Merkel, Angela (2011): Interview with Saarbrücker Zeitung, Bundeskanzleramt 
75
 Ibid. 
35 
 
questioned at this point. Is a humanitarian intervention to stop grave violations of 
human rights really a part of the strategic culture? The Chancellor speaks in clear terms 
of the defense of the security at home and the Defense Minister states that ‘the 
responsibility to protect a country’s civilian population if its government violates human 
rights is firmly anchored in international law. But does that mean we are allowed to 
intervene? Or does that mean we’re actually required to?’76 It appears that in terms of 
the conditions for the use of force, condition 2 only applies when condition 1 is fulfilled 
coevally.   
With Westerwelle pushing for more pressure on the Gaddafi Regime and keeping 
military options on the table if legitimized by the UN Security, Germany’s final 
decision to even abstain from vote is a memorable one. Given the possibility that 
Germany could have symbolically participated through logistic or medical 
contributions, Germany decision came as a surprise and imposed the German 
government to severe criticism from EU and NATO partners. While the strict ‘no’ to the 
deployment of the military, especially to combat troops can very well be explained with 
Germany’s very low risk tolerance, the abstention from vote cannot. Alan Miskimmon 
argues that Berlin could have been too sure that the US would not participate either.
77
 
The abstention is also frequently put into the context of two important regional 
elections.
78
 The abstention from vote along China and Russia was in the end maybe just 
‘the biggest foreign policy debacle since the founding of the Federal Republic’79, a 
mistake committed by an inexperienced Foreign Minister.  
In sum, the strategic culture is profoundly constituted in the strategic behavior of 
Germany in the Libya crisis, confirming the assumptions about behavior made in the 
previous chapter. The extremely low risk tolerance has shown to be the most dominant. 
It has a measurable influence on the conditions under which the use of force is applied 
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and the power to outplay Germany’s emphasis on cooperating with international 
organizations and their allied states.    
 
2. The UK’s strategic behavior in Libya  
 
„Tonight British forces are in action over Libya. They are part of an international 
coalition that come together to enforce the will of the United Nations and protect the 
Libyan people. […] What we are doing is necessary, it is legal and it is right. It is 
necessary because together with other we should prevent him from using his military 
against his own people. It is legal, because we have the backing of the United Nations 
Security Council and also of the Arab League and many others. And it is also right, 
because I believe we should not stand aside when this dictator murders his own people 
[…] I believe that we should all be confident that what we are doing is in an just cause 
and in our nation’s interest”80  
With this announcement from the 20
th
 of March 2011, David Cameron declared that 
from now on airstrikes of British forces were enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 
1973. Cameron makes yet a clear reference to the conditions for the use of force in this 
case by highlighting the moral interest as well as the national interest. While the moral 
interest is a universal one, Cameron’s referral to the national interest indicates that 
military force is an adequate instrument of foreign policy that should be applied when 
Britain’s national interest is at stake. This national interest was further explained when 
David Cameron was speaking in front of the House of Commons on March 18th, 
justifying Britain’s profound support for UN Security Council Resolution 1973: “Let us 
be clear where our interests lie. In this country we know what Colonel Gaddafi is 
capable of. We should not forget his support for the biggest terrorist atrocity on British 
soil. We simply cannot have a situation where a failed pariah state festers on Europe's 
southern border. This would potentially threaten our security, push people across the 
Mediterranean and create a more dangerous and uncertain world for Britain and for all 
our allies as well as for the people of Libya”81 Foreign Minister William Hague 
specified this opinion, when he showed himself concerned that ‘after these recent events 
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with Gaddafi running amok exacting reprisals on his own people, estranged from the 
rest of the world, as a potential source for terrorism in the future, that would be a danger 
to the national interest of this country”82  
The aspect of moral and national interest was embedded in a narrative of ‘three criteria 
which I set out consistently out over the last three weeks’83, that have been loosely 
adopted by Cameron when he made the speech in front of 10 Downing Street on the 
20th. According to William Hague, when commenting on the vote in favor for 
Resolution 1973, these include ‘a demonstrable need - and the actions and statements of 
the Gaddafi regime in recent days have provided that demonstrable need. Secondly a 
clear legal basis; this is the clear legal basis in the Resolution of the United Nations 
Security Council. And, third, broad support from within the region itself and that is 
evident in the statement of the Arab League and in the readiness to participate in a no 
fly zone, for instance, by members of the Arab League.’84 Next to the interest, the 
aspect of authorization and cooperation plays a main role in the decision-justification of 
Britain’s decision-making sphere. Given the fact that a unilateral military intervention 
might have only caused criticism from the countries that in general refused military 
action, the consequences for Britain within the international community would have 
been marginal, if not consequent action would have raised applause within its allies. 
The repeated mentioning of the UN as ‘the world’s governing body, the clearest 
possible resolution, the clearest possible legal basis of action’ and the involvement of 
the Arab World, emphasizing that this is ‘the Arab world asking us to act with them’85, 
can much more be related to the domestic requirements. The interventionist Blair years 
had caused frustrating results, the need for international legitimation and incorporation 
is therefore high. Hence decision-makers were especially eager to ensure that ‘the Arab 
League unanimously appealed for a resolution and a no fly zone’ and the Resolution 
1973 does ‘not empower us to implement regime change it empowers us to protect and 
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safeguard the civilian population so that they can, hopefully, in the future determine 
their own future’  
Connected to the international legitimation, is the risk awareness that is demonstrated 
by the decision-makers. Cameron answered in an interview that ‘of course I had to think 
extremely carefully before taking these steps’ but that ‘it does seem to me that it is right 
for Britain not to play some disproportioned part, not the grand stand, not something 
we’re not, but play our part with our allies, the American, the French, the Arab 
countries’.  As expected from the strategic culture of Britain, the decision-makers did 
not push forward an ‘all in’ approach including ground forces in order to end the 
conflict as soon as somehow possible but kept closely to the objectives of the UN 
Resolution. As William Hague confirmed in an interview right after the actions had 
begun: “Well here the UN resolution is also clear because it, while it does mandate [a 
no fly zone, enforcing cease fire], it’s very clear that there must not be a foreign 
occupation force in any part of Libya. So it does not support the idea of a ground 
invasion of Libya, let’s be clear about that.” Instead, military was used in a cost- and 
casualty-effective way to ensure an outcome of the civil-war in favor of the rebels.
86
  
In the end, the military contribution of Britain was composed of a formation of Typhoon 
fighters and one of Tornados G4 aircrafts, that were supported by several intelligence 
and tanker aircrafts with transport aircrafts to follow.
87
   
The British Government was eager to demonstrate how little effort has achieved so 
much in terms of ending the violence and avoiding civilian casualties. Foreign Minister 
William Hague published a letter he had received from ‘a member of the local council 
in Misurata, thanking Britain and the allies for their action[…] for coming to the aid of 
the Libyan people, as he puts it, in their most needy of hours’. Hague also particularly 
mentions that the local council could ‘testify for the effectiveness and the accuracy of 
those strikes and confirm that there has been not a single case of civilian injury let alone 
death in and around Misurata’88  
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In sum, the strategic culture shaped the strategic behavior to an extent that allows 
relating the decision-making process to the British strategic culture. The government 
has justified thoroughly, why in their eyes the use of force is appropriate and frequently 
pointed out the national interest that the operation entails. The conservative Tory 
government shaped a military contribution containing very low risk for British soldiers 
and a proportioned use of its vast military power to reach the objectives announced. 
Interestingly, British decision-making sphere put high emphasis on the legality of the 
mission and the embracing of the Arab world as partner and solicitant for the operation. 
As mentioned above, the United Kingdom was not necessarily required to have all 
possible legitimation, but demonstrated the legality as domestic authorization 
requirement. It is very likely, that the interventionism of Tony Blair, especially the Iraq 
war, has produced a recent change in British strategic culture towards more 
international cooperation. In the Libya case however, more international outlook is 
difficult to imply, as the US were crucially involved conducting the first attacks under 
their command.
89
  
 
3. France’ strategic behavior in Libya 
 
“France solemnly calls on all members of the Security Council to support this initiative 
and to adopt the draft resolution. If it is adopted, we are prepared to act with Member 
States — in particular Arab States — that wish to do so. We do not have much time left. 
It is a matter of days, perhaps even hours. Every hour and day that goes by means a 
further clampdown and repression for the freedom-loving civilian population, in 
particular the people of Benghazi.”90  
Alain Juppe’s urgent call in front of the UN Security Council for support on the 
resolution that France had drafted together with the UK and the US, is another sign for 
the role in front-row when the situation in Libya made a military intervention more and 
more necessary and likely. French president Sarkozy was the first western leader who 
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discussed the possibility of launching military strikes against Qaddafi ‘to assume its 
role, its role before history in stopping his murderous madness.’91 Already at the end of 
February 2011, when the UK was still seeking more profound international support, not 
seeing the point for military action already come, Nicolas Sarkozy called for a no-fly 
zone to ‘prevent the use of that country's warplanes against its population‘92.As the 
situation worsened in the beginning of March 2011, President Sarkozy was also the first 
western leader to discuss a ‘strategic plan that includes striking an extremely limited 
number of points which are the source of the most deadly operations’93. The reasoning 
of the French government solely concentrated on the humanitarian, moral aspect, 
highlighted by Foreign Minister Alain Juppe: “Colonel Al-Qadhafi’s troops pursue their 
violent conquest of liberated cities and territories. We must not give free rein to 
warmongers; we must not abandon civilian populations, the victims of brutal repression, 
to their fate; we must not allow the rule of law and international morality to be trampled 
underfoot.”94 France had made very clear, very early, that the country saw the 
conditions for the use of force as fulfilled in the Libyan case and that France is ready to 
lead the international community in such an effort. The French exceptionalism 
constituted in the notion of Grandeur can be observed in this willingness to counter 
grave violations of human rights as a powerful protector of international law. That the 
protection entails the use of military force has hereby not been questioned at all, 
confirming that France is willing to take offensive measures when serving its interest, 
although the interest is in the rhetoric of a wholly humanitarian nature.   
In this effort, France didn’t take much regard of their partners. Although seeking the 
legitimization by international law and regional powers, France unilaterally pushed the 
agenda forward towards decisive actions against Qaddafi. The best example for this 
unilateral engagement was the recognition of the National Libyan Council (NLC). On 
March 10th, President Sarkozy welcomed representatives of the NLC and declared that 
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he regards ‘the NLC as Libya’s legitimate representative’95 This untuned push forward 
that was accompanied by criticism of his European partners, shows how eager France 
was to take lead in this crisis, even if it would mean alienating key allies and acting 
unilaterally. It confirms the insights of strategic culture and goes even beyond, drifting 
towards non-cooperation. Another aspect regarding the way France cooperated with its 
allies, was the deep skepticism towards a political NATO engagement. When David 
Cameron announced that operational command would soon shift to NATO, Nicolas 
Sarkozy reasoned that ‘it would be playing into the hands of Colonel Qaddafi to say 
NATO is taking over’ because ‘NATO cannot swallow the United Arab Emirates and 
Qatar’, therefore is ‘the NATO issue a practical and not a political one. The political co-
ordination is with the 11-member coalition’.96 By highlighting the NATO’s difficult 
relation with the Arab World, the behavior shows the expected tendency away from the 
transatlantic security framework.  
The promotion of France as the leading force of the international community against 
Qaddafi, included the authorization of the UN Security Council and generally positive 
reactions to the plans on behalf of the Arab World. When speaking in front of the UN 
Security Council, Alain Juppe emphasized that ‘the international community has reacted 
in near unanimity’ and that ‘regional organizations have [also] expressed themselves 
forcefully. First and foremost, the League of Arab States called on the Security Council 
[…] to establish a no-fly zone’97. Although authorization requirements for the use of 
force are both domestically and internationally low, France showed that the 
confirmation of the UN Security Council and the embracement of regional powers are 
key requirements for the use of force.  
In sum can be observed that France’ strategic culture is constituted in its strategic 
behavior during crucial moments of the Libyan crisis. France saw very early the 
conditions for the use fulfilled and demonstrated great eagerness in leading the 
international community to fierce response to the crimes the Qaddafi regime was 
committing. France behavior towards its key allies was marked by the search for 
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international confirmation but also the unilateral pursue of their own interest with a 
political distance to the NATO. This is in line with the expectations, but goes beyond 
that, with a tendency towards unilateralism.  
 
B. Case Study Mali  
 
1. Germany’s strategic behavior in Mali 
 
When it became clear, that the Malian forces would not be able to withstand the fast 
approaching Islamist and Tuareg forces and France started its ad-hoc intervention, 
Germany’s security policy decision-making sphere, hurried to demonstrate full political 
support for France’ decision to answer the call of Malian government. In various 
statements, Merkel, Westerwelle and de Maziere, justified the intervention in front of 
the international law, the EU interests and the strategic rationale. Defense Minister de 
Maziere said in an interview three days after the intervention: “France’ intervention 
with military forces is consequent and correct. The Malian army was not able to stop the 
terrorists approaching from the north. This is an essential necessity though and declared 
goal of France’ intervention. France is acting according the resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council and the international law.”98 In an official statement 
immediately issued after the official beginning of Operation Serval, on the 11th of 
January, Guido Westerwelle had already confirmed that Operation Serval is legitimized 
by international law and strategic necessity, adding in a foot note that the French 
government had previously informed Germany.
99
 The reason for this was the statement 
of Guido Westerwelle earlier at the same day, when in an assessment of the situation in 
Mali, he had not lost a single word about a possible military intervention from Europe 
and displayed the position that Germany has had for most of the course of this conflict: 
“I am very concerned about the further escalation of the situation in Mali. […]It is right, 
to push on the efforts to deploy the African intervention force with all given dispatch. 
[…] Addressing the security situation, the EU has signaled the willingness to support 
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the training of the Malian forces, if – and only if – when the needed conditions are 
given.”100 Following these policy standpoints, Germany has acted with a cautious 
strategy regarding the prospect of a European (or German) military contribution but not 
in a countervailing fashion as it did in Libyan crises. Germany supported the drafts for 
the resolutions 2071 and 2085, giving a broad UN mandate to African Union and 
ECOWAS deploying troops and was also engaged and committed to the creation of the 
CSDP Training Mission, which was on the agenda since October 2012. On the necessity 
of action on the side of the international community, Angela Merkel noted that ‘free 
democratic states cannot accept that the North (of Mali) turns into a safe haven for 
international terrorism. We know that Malian forces are too weak to act. They need 
assistance.”101 Defense Minister de Maziere showed he was confident, that Germany is 
ready to meet expectations and responsibilities in international crisis management, 
including a possible German military contribution. Referring to Germany’s position as 
one of the biggest economies in the world, he stated: “If an engagement is the political 
will, necessity or decision, the Bundeswehr has to be capable of and ready for  military 
operations, and it has to be ready fast and without long preparations.”102 Still, the 
decision-making sphere made very clear that a participation of combat forces would be 
in no way an option, in contrary to other military assets like training staff and logistic 
material. 
After a phone conversation between Guido Westerwelle and French Foreign Minister 
Laurent Fabius, the Federal Foreign office issued a press release, saying: “Foreign 
Minister Westerwelle conveyed the German Government’s offer to examine together 
with the French Government how Germany, while not sending combat troops, can 
support the French mission in political, logistical, medical and humanitarian terms.”103 
Yet, in October after UN Security council Resolution 2071 had been passed, 
Westerwelle mentioned to the press that ‘Germany is not going to deliver weapons to 
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Mali. We also won’t send combat troops. It is about training and instruction. It’s about 
technical, financial and humanitarian support for an African Mission‘104.  
Again, the German reservations to the use of their own force have prevailed in the 
debate. Although not sidelined this time, it was obvious that the German idea of 
humanitarian intervention is mostly the idea of politically supporting other countries 
intervening. The risks of a possible asymmetric situation in West Africa with German 
combat troops involved have dominated the military discourse, with high ranking 
Bundeswehr –officials concerned ‘that the Bundeswehr is once again thoughtlessly and 
irresponsibly sent into a mission that is part of fragmentary political conception. The 
term training disguises what the Bundeswehr could face in Mali and that is a direct 
involvement into warlike fights. The soldiers rightfully ask themselves if they are again 
sent to the desert for alliance policies’105. This mentioned alliance policy as an aspect of 
German Foreign Policy is maybe the most significant one when examining the German 
relation to the use of force. As Germany’s strategic culture tends to embrace 
international organizations and the wide range of their allies, the decisions taken by 
those allies and organizations are supported and promoted until the very moment when 
decision-making turns into action. At this moment, Germany’s actual conditions for the 
use of force (immediate threat, defense of national and ally territory) dominate the 
cooperation aspect. Although it did not reach the extent as it did in the Libya-crisis, this 
element has been consistent across the cases.    
Also did the domestic authorization requirements again prevent a more relevant 
contribution. The sending of two Transall transport aircrafts to transport ECOWAS-
troops to Mali was not necessarily designed to play a part in the intervention, but due to 
the fact that this is ‘a measure below the barrier of a measure that requires a mandate of 
the German Bundestag.’106  
For Germany’s participation in the CSDP Mission EUTM Mali, the EU could agree on, 
on the 17th of January, and the sending of a special tanker aircraft following a French 
request, such a  mandate became necessary and approved on the 28th of February in the 
German Parliament. In total, Germany’s military was able to deploy Transall aircrafts, 
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four A310 tankers and contingent of military personnel of 330 consisting of 180 soldiers 
for the training mission and 150 as logistical transport assistance.
107
  
In sum, Germany’s strategic culture of extreme constraint regarding the use of military 
force and the extreme low-risk tolerance has been consistent across the cases. Also, the 
decision-makers struggle to meet on the one side the expectations of the international 
community and the domestic expectations to refuse using military force as foreign 
policy element. This contradiction has led to a remarkable critique of humanitarian 
organizations in Germany. They accuse Foreign Minister Westerwelle of mixing 
humanitarian assistance with military contribution in order sell Germany’s logistical, 
financial and medical support as meeting Germany’s responsibilities to militarily act in 
a humanitarian crisis.
108
   
 
2. The UK’s strategic behavior in Mali 
 
“The situation in Mali is a serious concern for the UK. It would not be in our interests to 
allow a terrorist haven to develop in Northern Mali. As a responsible member of the 
Security Council, we must support the region in limiting the danger of instability in that 
part of Africa, threatening UK interests. […] I would like to reassure the House that 
British forces will not undertake a combat role in Mali. The Prime Minister has 
authorized a limited logistical deployment following a direct request from one of our 
closest allies.[…] We must not allow northern Mali to become a springboard for 
extremism, and create instability in the wider West African region. The ferocity and 
fanaticism of the extremists in northern Mali must not be allowed to sweep unchecked 
into the country’s capital. France, which has an historic relationship with Mali, is quite 
rightly in the lead.”109  
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Summarizing the UK government’s standpoint on the French Intervention in Mali, 
Foreign Undersecretary Mark Simmonds demonstrated differences in the opinion of the 
decision-makings sphere across the two cases. While in Libya the UK saw itself 
required to participate and take a leading role in action, the responsibility for a military 
intervention was in Mali delegated to France, emphasizing its colonial past in West 
Africa. In explaining its political support and military contribution in form of logistical 
support and intelligence exchange, the British decision-justification reminded a lot of 
the German response.  
In a first reaction David Cameron praised the French intervention, highlighting that 
‘there is a very dangerous Islamist regime allied to al-Qaeda in control of the north of 
that country’ and because this threat was now pushing forward to the south ‘we should 
support the action the French have taken’110. For this reason, ‘we were first out of the 
blocks, as it were to say to the French, we’ll help you, we’ll work with you and we’ll 
share what intelligence we have with you and try to help you with what you are 
doing’111. Still, as in the German case, a role of British forces in the combats was 
consequently denied from the beginning of the intervention, with David Cameron and 
William Hague jointly confirming that ‘no British forces will be involved in a combat 
role at all.’112 This should be mainly due to the action that France had already taken and 
was inevitably forced to presume whether additional combat forces of the international 
community would accompany them or not. After the UN Security Council Resolution 
2085 had passed, David Cameron’s special representative to the Sahel, including Mali, 
showed himself concerned that ‘if we don't act, we send a message to all secessionist 
groups that the international community turns a blind eye to states within states [and] 
there is very real threat of further attacks in Africa and, eventually, Europe, the Middle 
East and beyond’ and added that ‘I'm not going in with a closed mind to rule anything 
out. We will do our best to play our part. I haven't ruled anything out.’113 It can be 
argued, that if the request to the French government on behalf of the Malian 
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Government would not have occurred, that for British decision-makers a military 
intervention would have lied within a broader scope of options, dependent on the 
development of the situation. As this outcome was avoided, the traditionally low risk 
tolerance ruled out an engagement in combat, because the British national interest was 
already served by the French intervention and the support could occur in very cost-
effective way without harming British military personnel.  
The British support for the EUTM Mali was also comparable to the German response. 
Foreign Office Minister David Lidington welcomed the creation of a CSDP mission 
because ‘the EU has an important role to play as part of the international response to the 
crisis in Mali’, but also emphasized that ‘the training mission will be time-limited with a 
clear mandate to advice and train Malian armed forces: it will not be engaged in 
combat’.114 Defense Secretary Philip Hammond outlined after the agreement, which 
additional military assets are planned in for the CSDP Mission. He stated that apart 
from financial assistance for the African-led intervention force and the logistical 
assistance already provided to the French consisting of two transport planes and a 
surveillance aircraft, the UK will contribute ‘up to 40 British personnel either in a 
headquarters or training team role’ but not provide troops in a combat role or force 
protection for the mission’ as ‘that role is being carried out by French and Czech 
personnel.’ So although contributing to all initiatives taken during the course of the 
crises, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2071 and 2085, the EUTM Mali and the 
French unilateral intervention, the United Kingdom avoided the use of their own 
force.
115
  
In this case, the low-risk tolerance and the high domestic authorization requirements 
were the constituted, dominant factors of Britain’s Strategic culture. In the view of 
British decision-makers the interests and the influence that the United Kingdom has in 
francophone West-Africa did not make up for a more risky response in form of a 
combat participation. The non-commitment of the NATO and the US has very likely 
played its part in those considerations and enforced the cautiousness of British decision-
makers. Persistent over the two cases, was the high domestic authorization requirements 
and the embracing of all included international organizations. A plausible explanation 
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for this is impact of the Blair legacy on now more cautious and risk-aware British public 
discourse in terms of military interventions and Britain’s heavy reliance on the 
transatlantic link. The cooperation level that was estimated is therefore only partially 
appropriate as both cases illustrate a clear shift towards more international cooperation. 
 
3. France’ strategic behavior in Mali 
 
"French forces brought their support this afternoon to Malian army units to fight against 
terrorist elements. This operation will last as long as is necessary. The terrorists have 
recently regrouped on the line that artificially separates North- and South-Mali, they 
have even advanced and seek to strike a fatal blow to the very existence of Mali. France, 
like its African partners and the international community cannot accept this. We are 
facing an aggression, so I decided that France is ready to respond on the side of our 
African partners, on request of Malian authorities. France will do this within the 
framework of the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. We will be ready 
to stop the terrorist offensive, because this is the requirement of solidarity and 
responsibility.”116  
At the time of this statement given by French President Francois Hollande, informing 
the public about the French military intervention in Mali, first air strikes had already 
been conducted. The French reaction in form of a unilateral intervention, naturally the 
key aspect of the Mali conflict, can even more than the Libyan case be seen as a 
profound constitution of the notion of Grandeur and the strategic options it implies. 
Again, a French President took the lead when international political pressure turned into 
action. The special relation with Mali as an ex-colony serves in this regard as an 
amplifier, which can be noted in the dominating rhetoric of post-colonial responsibility 
and friendship. This was especially emphasized, as France’ national interest of securing 
industrial engagement in west-Africa seemed to apparent to international observers 
which compelled Francois Hollande to remind that ‘France is not pursuing any 
particular interests other than the safety of a country that is a friend and no other 
purpose than the fight against terrorism. That’s why our action is approved by the 
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international community and welcomed across the African States’117 To not let any 
confusion about the objectives of the operation occur, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabuis 
defined the three key objectives of the military operation: “The first is to stop the 
southward offensive by the armed terrorist groups who were threatening the whole of 
Mali and particularly the capital, Bamako. This operation is under way and is going 
satisfactorily. The second objective is to prevent the collapse of Mali. This is the 
essential precondition for restoring Mali’s territorial integrity. The third objective is to 
allow the implementation of the international resolutions, whether those of the United 
Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS or the EU. This is of course our main 
objective”118. Whether or not materialistic interest formed the cornerstone of strategic 
thinking in Paris or the violent situation and the defense of the population, France 
proved again the assumption regarding the conditions for the use of force and showed 
also, considerably more than in the Libyan case, that it is prepared to take high risks in 
order to confirm its self-perceived high standing in the world.  
Still, this standing in the world proved to be very closely related to the legality in front 
of international law. The reference to the Malian request and the UN Security Council 
resolution and the Charter of the United Nations highlights the contemporary desire in 
all western countries to demonstrate international consensus and regional ownership. 
Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius declared regarding the legitimacy of the French 
intervention: “I want to stress that this intervention falls strictly within international law. 
It responds to a formal request by the Malian President and is being conducted in 
accordance with the UN Charter, in compliance with UNSCRs 2056, 2071 and 2085. 
The framework is therefore the UN, Mali is making the request, and our partners are the 
Africans and the international community. Obviously, we don’t intend to act alone. We 
have – and I would like to highlight this – almost unanimous international political 
support. We’ve acted in a fully transparent manner; we’ve informed all our partners.”119 
For France in this case, this consideration was very meaningful as France had been 
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frequently accused of using its post-colonial influence to pursue economic interest 
politics with 37 major military operations from 1960 to 2006.
120
  
As it was the case in Libya, France did not seek the assistance or commitment the of 
NATO in this conflict, which was confirmed by NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen who said, that no request for assistance was transmitted by the French nor 
did the NATO discuss this case because the UN Security Council foresees an African-
led stabilization force.
121
 Instead, France accepted the help of particular key allies 
although this help has jointly been a merely symbolic, logistical assistance.  
In sum it could be observed that in the Malian case the assumed strategic behavior has 
prevailed. The fight against terrorism, the stability of industrial assets in the region and 
solidarity for the former colony were vital interests at stake, which fully justified a 
military operation at considerable risk, conducted practically unilaterally. For this 
operation France sought the legal confirmation and political support of its key allies and 
welcomed assistance and could rely on very low internal authorization requirements. 
The focus of cooperation was clearly directed towards Europe although US surveillance 
and intelligence was accepted. The NATO - just like in the Libyan case - was avoided to 
the most possible extent.   
 
 
C. Summary of the Findings 
 
In the case of Germany, the identified strategic culture translated profoundly into 
strategic behavior in both cases. Interestingly, the German rhetoric and political self-
perception as an international security actor indicated a strategic culture, which includes 
countervailing grave violations of human rights with military force when necessary. The 
participation in the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan with combat troops (although 
restraint in the mandate), had suggested that such a normalization process indeed had 
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taken place. Germany’s strategic behavior however clearly showed that the conditions 
for the use of force are practically limited to the defense of the own (or ally) territory 
and immediate threats to national security. Germany’s extremely low-risk tolerance 
marked the core of German rhetoric regarding an operational military strategy and 
served as explanation and tranquilization of the war-wary German population. This 
rhetoric founds its peak in the abstention from vote in the Libyan case and the 
justification of that decision. Germany’s strategic culture can explain the only symbolic 
contribution in the Malian case and could have explained a symbolic contribution in the 
Libyan case, but it is not able to provide a plausible explanation for the abstention from 
vote. The cooperation and the international authorization of the use of force were in 
both cases sought in the most multilateral setting possible, confirming what has been 
expected. Germany’s domestic authorization requirements proved to be extremely high. 
The domestic legal framework strictly limits the strategic options Germany possess due 
to the definition of the Bundeswehr in Germany’s Basic Law while the historic anti-
nationalism and anti-militarism dominates the public debate.  
The United Kingdom perceived the potential risk and cost of a military intervention in 
Libya as justified regarding the strong international commitment, especially of the US. 
As expected, the defense of the national interest is just as an important part regarding 
the decision-making process as it is the humanitarian necessity. In the Malian case, this 
commitment was missing which led to a contribution on a very low-risk level with out-
of-combat troops. Also part of the decision in Mali, was the fact that France did not 
leave very much to do apart from logistical assistance. A more offensive strategy would 
have therefore been illogical. Without the intervention from France, the United 
Kingdom would probably have applied the same requirements in Mali as it did in Libya 
and participated in an international effort. The United Kingdom cooperated with 
international organizations and allies in order to lower the risk of the operation. 
Comparing the Libyan and the Malian case reveals the expected strong relation to the 
US and the NATO when it comes to own military actions.  
In the case of France, the strategic behavior exceeded the assumptions derived from the 
identified strategic culture in the contrary direction as it does in the German case. In 
both cases, the French decision-maker’s rhetoric was very much implying the notion of 
Grandeur and the independent, leading role France wants to play in international 
politics. In the Libyan case this resulted in the demanding promotion of military strikes 
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and the implementation of the no-fly zone, which contained unilateral elements not in 
line with European and transatlantic partners. In the Malian case, France even decided 
to militarily intervene by itself, taking unilaterally the risks and possible consequences 
of such an operation. As expected, this behavior is showing the national interest as a 
justification, with the national interest being a proof of its self-perception as well as 
materialistic interests. Also in both cases it is shown that cooperation ought to go along 
French interest and is therefore happening as long as France’ agenda is the leading 
element. Still, France is seeking a solid legal legitimization for its actions as it is 
sensitive for the impact of other regional powers and the political support of its allies, 
while it was expected to act on the traditional low domestic but also on low 
international authorization requirements. 
 
V) Conclusions 
 
A. On Strategic Culture as analytical tool in Security Studies 
 
The ongoing circulating analytical and methodological debate around the notion of 
Strategic Culture has indicated that it is an instrument which should be applied with the 
utmost caution and this warning has proved to be justified. It was certainly 
demonstrated that an image of a contemporary Strategic Culture is in most cases not 
able to produce solid predictions about the strategic behavior in very specific strategic 
contexts. It would be necessary to identify an extensive set of sub-assumptions for a 
broad selection of different strategic contexts that would have to entail a huge variety of 
variables to determine. It can be stated at this point, the notion of Strategic Culture does 
maybe not defy falsifiability but it most certainly defies determinism. As Ken Booth put 
it, the study of strategic culture is a demanding intellectual challenge that will always 
rather be art than science, as like most important dimensions of international politics.
122
 
In the case of Britain, it could be demonstrated very well how ambitiously changing 
Foreign Policy had changed the Strategic behavior almost completely to the contrary of 
what could have been expected before Tony Blair came to office. This indicates that 
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there is a variety of aspects with different magnitudes able to change solid historic 
tradition.  
This does not mean however, that the notion of Strategic Culture is not useful in the 
study of nation state behavior regarding the use of force. Although sometimes key 
aspects of behavior changed across the contexts, it was within a range that was not 
contradicting the overall impression of the strategic culture of the countries. It was 
certainly shown that an image of a contemporary strategic culture is able to give a 
plausible framework of limited options and assumed reactions. Most plausible, in fact 
close to determinism, has been proved the German Strategic culture that was so 
crucially influenced by the horrific Nazi-Regime and the consequences of its behavior. 
Germany has produced a line of security policy standpoints and regulatory practices that 
cannot be explained by any structural-materialistic theory but only with the notion of 
Strategic Culture. Therefore, the comparison of the three different strategic cultures is 
also able to give plausible insights regarding the question if these strategic cultures 
show compatibility, which would be a key requirement for an efficient CSDP Crisis 
Management and the conducting of the Petersberg Tasks on an EU-level.  
 
B. On the compatibility of the three strategic cultures 
 
As the strategic cultures have been constituted to a sufficient extent in the strategic 
behavior across two cases of similar military tasks and different strategic context, it is 
now possible to make statements about the observed compatibility regarding the use of 
force in humanitarian crises that are covered by the Petersberg Task.  
In general, the strategic culture of France and the United Kingdom are to a very large 
extent similar regarding the role that the military and the use of force play as foreign 
policy instrument. Both countries share a long tradition of military interventions and 
have a clear conception regarding the conditions for the use of force. British and French 
decision-makers have shown in both cases that they embrace the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ that was unanimously adopted on the 2005 UN summit123, as part of their 
responsibilities as permanent members of the UN Security Council. It is in both 
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countries widely accepted and demanded to clearly define and communicated why a 
humanitarian intervention is not only morally justified but also in the nation’s very 
interest.  
These similarities have translated into the strategic behavior as well in the decision-
justifications of the decision making sphere and resulted into a demonstrated strong 
partnership in the Libyan-case. The partnership in Mali has to be interpreted with more 
caution however. Although Britain’s military did only provide a rather symbolic 
contribution to the French intervention, it can be argued that this was a reciprocal 
interest for both countries. While France was eager to demonstrate its unilateral 
responsibility and readiness to act in francophone West-Africa, the United Kingdom 
was able to pursue a proportionate and conservative approach, doing justice to the 
relatively high domestic authorization requirements and the non-commitment of the 
NATO. Because the United Kingdom had absolutely no need to take risks after France’ 
unilateral action, it can be argued that these very specific political aspects have 
prevented a broader British commitment rather than a strategic culture of restraint.  
It was also possibly to trace and confirm differences between two the countries. While 
the United Kingdom has a very strong link to the transatlantic framework and sees 
introducing the US into the operational framework as a way to reduce the risks 
significantly, in France, the notion of grandeur implies the independency from bi- or 
multilateral alliances. This especially counts for the NATO and the US. In Libya, 
France tried to avoid the transatlantic link and promoted the Franco-British relation 
while in Mali, France acted unilaterally, ignoring the non-commitment of the NATO 
and the US.  
Completely different is the case for Germany’s strategic culture. It became more and 
clearer in those recent crises that the German strategic culture is high incompatible to 
France and Great Britain. Although the rhetoric of the decision-makers follows those of 
the British and French in condemning grave violations of human rights, highlighting the 
responsibility of the international community to act and promoting hard decisions on a 
broad multilateral basis, Germany rules out his own engagement either right from the 
start or even in the most critical moments. Germany’s behavior in the Libya-crisis is of 
course related to the anti-nationalistic, anti-militaristic and anti-interventionist strategic 
culture but still inexplicable. The abstention from vote along the BRIC countries has 
rightfully produced severe criticism and pulverized Germany’s political desire to 
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become a normalized security actor demonstrating its vast economic potential. 
Germany’s wish to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council seems 
from this perspective a very strong overestimation of one’s own capabilities. Put apart 
from this grave political mistake in Libya, Germany has also in the Malian case 
demonstrated the huge gap between self-aspirations and the reality of their domestic 
legal and social restrictions. The German legal process is not at all suitable for a quick, 
consequent response to a humanitarian crisis in form of an intervention, as the use of the 
Bundeswehr is thoroughly bound to the defense of an immediate threat and only allows 
the military action beyond that under strict restrictions and with full parliamentarian 
participation and control. Additionally, the fierce renitence against the use of the 
military at all as foreign policy instrument, that has been fully persistent across time and 
contexts, continuously slows and restraints decision-making processes and is either used 
as inner political calculation by or manifested as solid credo inside the decision-makers.  
Adding Germany to the comparison reveals the big gap and high incompatibility 
between Germany on the one side and France and the United Kingdom on the other 
side. France and the United Kingdom share key aspects in their strategic cultures that 
overlap to a degree, which would allow further integration in defense issues. 
Additionally - France and the United Kingdom taken together - they embrace a broad 
spectrum of interests and responsibilities in most regions of the world. While often 
reciprocal, the differences between the specific interests don’t defy a strong cooperation 
but just might define which of the countries turns out to be the leading force in an 
initiative. Germany, in this regard, could be classified as the sick man within Europe’s 
big three. Its strategic culture of extreme constraint clashes with the external demand 
and political desire for more international responsibility, leaving no significant 
assistance in international crises except rhetorical and diplomatic support 
That impression is very much reflected and confirmed by the Franco-British defense 
cooperation, announced in November 2010, entailing the ‘strengthening of operational 
linkages between the French and UK Armed Forces, sharing and pooling of materials 
and equipment, building of joint facilities, mutual access to defense markets, and 
increased industrial and technological co-operation’124. Enforcing the bilateral ties on 
security and defense issues to this extent while sidelining in Germany the crucial factor 
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for a further European Integration in this regard, can therefore be expected to have 
severe consequences for CSDP crisis management, meaning crisis management at an 
EU-level. 
 
C. On the consequences for CSDP crisis management 
 
“The European Union, for its part, has failed miserably. ‘Institutional’ Europe has not 
faced up to the challenge. In the North African saga it does not exist. It is incapable of 
agreeing on how to act, on whether to recognize the Libyan opposition and most, of all, 
on the legitimacy of the use of force. The disunity is total and particularly striking when 
it is a question of deciding on war – that is to say when history becomes tragedy and it 
is necessary to move from frothy rhetoric about the rights of man.”125  
This devastating conclusion of the renowned French newspaper ‘Le monde’ is an 
example of how the EU’s role in the Libya conflict was perceived, highlighting the 
disunity between the countries in a situation where no time was to be left. Others 
described it as ‘Europe's 'perfect storm', revealing all of the EU's inherent weaknesses 
while simultaneously offering an opportunity to put into use its full spectrum of 
instruments.
126
 This study hasn’t revealed much to counter this perception but illustrated 
that persistent, individual strategic cultures give a plausible explanation for this 
disunity. Much more important, by putting the focus on the most crucial moments (the 
final decision about a humanitarian intervention) of the two conflicts, it has been shown 
that the EU did not play a role at all when the use of force became necessary. The same 
counts for the conflict in Mali, where the French intervention and broad military effort 
did disguise that if had the jihadist militias been allowed to march on Bamako the whole 
idea of a Training Mission and further EU support would have become meaningless.
127
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But besides the fact that ‘today the EU institutions are simply not equipped to launch a 
rapid response operation of this type’128, the high discrepancy between the German 
strategic culture on the one side and the French and British on the other, make it highly 
implausible that a ‘European Strategic Culture’ as outlined in European Security 
Strategy could ever evolve. It is not imaginable that there will ever be German combat 
troops involved in a humanitarian intervention under EU-initiative and demand, without 
a profound and case-specific evaluation by the German Parliament. Not even to 
mention, that the German Basic Law would have to be thoroughly revised in order to 
broad the operational spectrum according to what is needed for a rapid response in such 
situations. The consequence of this is, that although both cases (especially Mali) 
entailed exactly the description of a humanitarian crisis for which the EU Battle Group 
Concept was once implemented, an actual use of this military arm of the EU was neither 
in Libya nor in Mali anyway near of serious consideration. Still, it would be not 
justified to just blame the German strategic behavior for this consistent failure of the 
CSDP crisis management. Great Britain and especially France, where the notion of 
empire and grandeur respectively are still very influential, do not show a high interest in 
a European consensus but reserve their right to act unilaterally or bilaterally according 
to their own national interest and international law. And while France is continuously 
pushing for a French-led European security framework independent from the NATO, 
the United Kingdom keeps closely their ties to the United States and the transatlantic 
security framework.  
Because this incompatibility between the European security actors, that directly derives 
from the individual strategic cultures, the German Sueddeutsche Zeitung already 
predicts the upcoming end for CSDP. The renowned newspaper argues that because of 
the disunity between its actors and its insufficient military capabilities, the Common 
Security and Defense Policy is ‘heading for its collapse’129. As mentioned before, the 
study of strategic culture should not entail such determinism. But with the three 
strategic cultures not being compatible, a functioning, effective CSDP crisis 
management is most certainly not plausible.   
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